Russia finds Ukraine’s “weak link”: Experts reveal unprotected targets now under fire
The enemy is striking with “dense” barrages against poorly defended regional power companies and gas extraction sites, using “decoy drones.” Is Ukraine ready for winter?
The aftermath of the Russian strike on Ukraine’s energy infrastructure
Russian forces have launched a new, more concentrated and combined wave of attacks on Ukraine’s energy infrastructure — targeting gas extraction facilities and regional distribution networks. This shift in tactics has already caused serious damage and demands an urgent adaptation of the air defense system.
The report comes from RBC-Ukraine.
Shift in targets: from thermal power plants to gas production
The new wave of strikes began two months ago, including an attack on the SOCAR oil depot in Odesa region and the destruction of the Trypillia thermal power plant on September 8. But the most alarming development has been Russia’s growing focus on gas extraction infrastructure and distribution sites.
In early October, gas production facilities in Kharkiv and Poltava regions suffered the most powerful combined strike since the start of the full-scale war. CEO of Naftogaz of Ukraine, Sergii Koretskyi described it as “the most massive attack” to date, suggesting its impact was even greater than that of the February strike, when daily output losses reached 40%.
Recent bombardments have caused problems across Zaporizhzhia, Kherson, Vinnytsia, Kharkiv, as well as Lviv and Ivano-Frankivsk regions. The situation remains most difficult in Sumy and Chernihiv regions, where, according to Deputy Energy Minister Mykola Kolesnyk, emergency power outage schedules are being used to carry out repairs.
New tactics: intensity and “decoy drones”
Experts say the increase in damage to energy infrastructure is directly linked to Moscow’s tactical shift.
Deputy General Director of an electronic warfare systems manufacturer Anatolii Khrapchynskyi explains that the enemy now uses not just mixed strikes, but denser and more synchronized ones:
1. Combining various weapons and increasing strike density by launching more missiles and drones simultaneously from multiple directions;
2. Timing attacks so that the volume of incoming threats far exceeds air defense capacity, using intelligence on reloading cycles;
3. Actively deploying “decoy drones,” including Shaheds, and missiles flying over populated areas to complicate interception.
Striking at the “weak link”
Hennadii Riabtsev, director of the Psychea Center, emphasized that Russia has also changed its target selection: it now strikes mainly at distribution networks — regional energy companies (oblenergos) and other local suppliers that deliver services directly to consumers.
Riabtsev called this shift “extremely dangerous,” noting that Ukraine’s engineering protection programs were centralized and focused mainly on large state companies such as Ukrenergo and Naftogaz.
“Local authorities were responsible for securing supply companies, but due to a lack of funds, the necessary level of protection was not ensured everywhere,” Riabtsev said.
He believes that analysis of this “weak link” led Moscow to focus on less protected local operators. Riabtsev urged an immediate review of the reasons behind the highly effective strikes on Shostka and Chernihiv to prepare the energy system for the winter period.